University of Massachusetts Law Review
Volume 3
Issue 1 Trends and Issues in Intellectual Property

Article 4

January 2008

Computer Programs Under the United States
Intellectual Property System: Sui Generis
Legislation is Needed
Joseph Francis Agnelli, III

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.umassd.edu/umlr
Part of the Intellectual Property Commons, and the Legislation Commons
Recommended Citation
Agnelli, III, Joseph Francis (2008) "Computer Programs Under the United States Intellectual Property System: Sui Generis
Legislation is Needed," University of Massachusetts Law Review: Vol. 3: Iss. 1, Article 4.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.umassd.edu/umlr/vol3/iss1/4

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository @ University of Massachusetts School of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in University of Massachusetts Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Repository @ University of Massachusetts School
of Law.

COMPUTER PROGRAMS UNDER THE
UNITED STATES INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY SYSTEM: SUI GENERIS
LEGISLATION IS NEEDED
JOSEPH FRANCIS AGNELLI, III*
INTRODUCTION

Computers and computer software command an ever
expanding and prominent role in the world, and are
constantly evolving. Thus, various international governments
are fraught with enacting appropriate legislation associated
with protection of computer software. Should the United
States Congress use copyright law, patent law, or a measure
of both? This is the predicament Congress has been faced
with regarding the rapid evolvement of computer software.
This article will attempt to resolve that dilemma.
Section I of this article explores the different avenues of
intellectual property protection presently available for
computer software1 here in the United States. Section II then
discusses how the European Community has resolved the
computer program crisis under European intellectual property
law. Lastly, section III will illustrate why sui generis2
legislation would be the paramount way for Congress to
attack the intricacy that is created by computer programs
under American intellectual property law.
*The author is an attorney and 2007 graduate of the Southern New
England School of Law. All opinions and/or inaccuracies are of this
writer, and do not represent the opinions or views of the Faculty or
Students of the Southern New England School of Law, or the Southern
New England School of Law Roundtable Symposium Law Journal.
1
The terms “software” and “program” will be used interchangeably
throughout this article.
2
Sui Generis has been defined as a body of law which is “[O]f its
own kind or class; unique or peculiar.” BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1475
(8th Ed., 2004).
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I. PROTECTION FOR COMPUTER PROGRAMS UNDER
UNITED STATES INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
JURISPRUDENCE
This section will scrutinize the present state of intellectual
property protection for computer programs in the United
States. This section will begin with a discussion and analysis
of copyright law, the simpler and more applicable, and will
conclude with an analysis of patent law, the complex and
controversial. The goal of this section is to help you, the
reader, fully understand the evolution and problems that
computer programs pose to Congress and, more importantly,
to the courts. Hopefully, when you, the reader, are finished
with this section, you will realize that action in the form of
sui generis legislation needs to be taken to bring protection
for computer programs into focus in American intellectual
property jurisprudence.
A. United States Copyright Law as Applied to
Computer Programs.
“From its beginning, the law of copyright has
developed in response to significant changes
in technology.”3
Throughout relevant history, United States Copyright law
emerged as the most applicable intellectual property
protection available to computer programs. This was due to
the fact that computer programs and some of their related
components tend to fit rather well into Copyright law. For
example, the computer programs and their user manuals have
been considered writings,4 databases have sometimes been

3

Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430
(1984), cited by Justice Walker in Computer Assoc. International, Inc. v.
Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 696 (2d Cir. 1992).
4
See Synercom Technology v. University Computing Co., 462 F.
Supp. 1003 (N.D.Tex.1978).
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considered copyrightable compilations,5 and the visual
displays on computer monitors can be considered graphic
works.6 Also, the source code of a computer program, or the
collection of statements or declarations which allows the
computer programmer to communicate with the computer
using a reserved number of instructions,7 and the object code,
or the representation of code that a compiler or assembler
generates by processing a source code file,8 are both
copyrightable subject matter.9
By way of background, the Copyright Office began
accepting copyright applications for computer programs in
1964.10 As computers posed a new and intricate area of
technology, Congress established the National Commission
on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works
(CONTU) in 1974.11 The purpose of the CONTU was to
study the implications of new and recent technologies, and to
suggest that federal intellectual property law be revised to
accommodate these changes.12 After significant hearings and
research conducted by experts, the board comprising CONTU
decided that “it was clearly the intent of Congress to include
computer programs within the scope of copyrightable subject
matter in the Act of 1976.”13

5

But see Feist v. Rural Tel., 499 U.S. 340, (1991), and Bellsouth
Adver. & Publ’g Corp. v. Donnelly Info. Publ’g, Inc., 933 F.2d 952 (11th
Cir.1991).
6
David W. Carstens, Legal Protection of Computer Software:
Patents, Copyrights, and Trade Secrets, 20 J. CONTEMP. L. 13, 45 (1994).
7
See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int’l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521 (D.
Colo.1992).
8
See GCA Corp. v. Chance, C-82-1063-MHP, 1982 WL 1281 (N.D.
Cal. Aug 31,1982).
9
Carstens, supra note 6; see also 17 U.S.C. §106 (1988).
10
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND
RELATED STATES DOCTRINES: CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 846 (REV. 5TH ED., 2004) (1973).
11
See National Commission on New Technological Uses of
Copyrighted Works, Final Report (1978) [hereinafter CONTU]; see also
Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for
Application Programs, 41STANFORD L. REV.. 1045, 1046 (1989).
12
Menell, supra note 11, at 1046.
13
CONTU, supra note 11, at 16.
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More significantly, the 1980 amendments to the 1976
Copyright Act14 helped bring the Act up to speed with
advances in technology,15 including computer programs. The
amended Act defined a computer program as “a set of
statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a
computer in order to bring about a certain result.” 16
The inclusion of such a definition in section 101 of the
Copyright Act is an indication that Congress may have
intended computer programs to be analyzed as copyrightable
pursuant to that definition.17 The problem with this strict
definition is that it excludes from copyright manuals, flow
charts, and any other representation that cannot be used to
bring about that certain result.18
However, in Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.,19 the Third
Circuit held that so long as the computer program is original
and fixed in a tangible medium, it will be copyrightable
subject matter “whether it is expressed in words, in a flow
chart, in source code or object code, and whether it is
embodied in paper, magnetic disk tape or semiconductor
chip.”20 Thus, the courts broadened the scope of the “fixed”
requirement, opening the door for computer programs to
become copyrightable subject matter.
But what does “fixed” actually imply? Section 101 of the
Copyright Act sheds some light, and reads “[A] work is fixed
in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a
copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author,
is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be
perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated for a
14

Copyright Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2544 (1976) (codified as amended
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1980)).
15
BERNARD A. GALLER, SOFTWARE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
PROTECTION: COPYRIGHT AND PATENT ISSUES FOR COMPUTER AND
LEGAL PROFESSIONALS 3 (Foreword by Jack E. Brown, 1995).
16
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 10, at 77.
17
William F. Patry, Copyright and Computer Programs: It’s all in
the Definition,14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 23 (1996).
18
Id. at 32.
19
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240,
(3d Cir.1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
20
Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1249
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period of more than transitory duration.”21 Section 101’s
definition of “fixed” continues, “[A] work consisting of
sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, is “fixed”
for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being
made simultaneously with its transmission.”22 The latter half
of this definition would seem to be applicable to computer
programs, and the Third Circuit’s decision in Williams
Electronics, Inc. v. Artic International, Inc.23 discusses this
requirement, “fixed in any tangible medium of expression,”
as it applies to video games.
In Williams, the court was presented with a dispute over
two coin-operated video games, “Defender” manufactured by
Williams Electronics, and “Defense Commander”
manufactured by Artic International.
Williams’ game,
“Defender,” comprised several unique and original audioArtic’s video game, “Defense
visual features.24
Commander,” was virtually identical to Williams’.25 As a
result, Williams brought suit against Artic alleging
infringement of three of its “Defender” copyrights. The
District Court agreed with Williams that Artic had in fact
infringed three of its copyrights.26 Artic appealed the lower
courts judgment. The issue facing the appellate court was
whether the audio-visual copyrights of “Defender” satisfied
the “fixed in any tangible medium of expression”
requirement.27
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the
lower court by holding that the audio-visual features of the
“Defender” video game were fixed in a tangible medium of
expression because there was always a repetitive sequence of
21

17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
Id.
23
Williams Elec., Inc. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir.
1982).
24
Id. at 872.
25
Id. at 872–73.
26
These acts of infringement included the infringement of the
computer program copyright for the “Defender” game by selling kits
which contained a copy of the video game; and infringement of two of
Williams’ audiovisual copyrights for the video game by selling copies of
the game “Defender.” Id. at 873.
27
See id. at 873–74; see also GALLER, supra note 15, at 48.
22
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a substantial amount of the sounds and images of the game,
of which remained unchanged and constant regardless of how
the player operated the game.28 The Third Ciruit also found
in favor of Williams on the object code issue and rejected
Artic’s argument that object codes cannot be protected
because a copy must be intelligible to human beings and is
only intended as a means of communication to humans.29
The Third Circuit held, in response, that “[A] ‘copy’ is
defined to include a material object in which a work is fixed
‘by any method now known or later developed, and from
which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device.’”30 31
Thus, in summary, the Williams case held that computer
programs, which display on screen images, (like a vast
majority of software on the market) are copyrightable
because they are “fixed” in a “tangible medium”32 as required
by the Copyright Act. 33
28

See Williams, 685 F.2d at 874; see also GALLER, supra.
Williams,. 685 F.2d at 876–77; see also GALLER, supra.
30
Williams, 685 F.2d at 877; see also 17 U.S.C. §101 (1976).
31
The Williams case came after a slew of earlier cases involving
similar copyrighted video games and their infringement. See e.g., Atari,
Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Electronics Corp., 672 F.2d 607
(7th Cir. 1982) partly superseded by statute as stated in Scandia Down
Corp. v. Eroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, (7th Cir. Ill. 1985) (the Atari court
found for infringement and held that even though the defendant’s game
was not "virtually identical" to Pac-Man, it captured the "total concept
and feel" of and was substantially similar to Pac-Man); Stern Elecs., Inc.
v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir., 1982) (which held that the player's
participation did not withdraw the audiovisual work from copyright
eligibility); and Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466 (D.
Neb. 1981)(which held that the fact that the audiovisual works [video
game] could not be viewed without a machine did not mean the works
were not fixed).
32
The tangible medium used here was the computer monitor, which,
as the court held, was the equivalent of a machine.
33
It is important to note that several aspects of the Artic game
“Defense Commander” indicated that it was practically copied verbatim
from Williams’ game, “Defender.” For example, an identical error of an
earlier version of “Defender” showed up within the “Defense
Commander” game at the exact same time it showed up in “Defender.”
Williams,. 685 F.2d at 876, n.6. In addition, and quite amusingly, both
29
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Two other landmark decisions which help exemplify why
computer programs are considered copyrightable subject
matter include Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental
Laboratory, Inc.,34 and Computer Associates International,
Inc. v. Altai, Inc.35
Whelan involved a dispute over a computer program
which was designed to aid in the management of dental
laboratories.36 Whelan alleged that Dentcom’s licensing of
the Dentalab program, and Dentcom’s program itself,
infringed Whelan Associates' copyright in Dentalab.37 The
District Court found for Whelan on all claims.38 The District
Court held that Elaine Whelan was the sole author of the
Dentalab program and that the agreement between Jaslow and
Whelan made it apparent that the parties intended ownership
games displayed a listing of high scores achieved by past players by
listing their initials, and the Artic game listed the initials of employees of
Williams who achieved those scores on the “Defender” game. Id. at 876,
n.6. Finally, Williams inputted a “hidden” copyright notice deep inside
its memory devices and when the contents of Artic’s memory were pulled
up, so did Williams’ “hidden” copyright notice. Id.
34
Whelan Assoc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
35
Computer Assoc. Int’l., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir.
1992), affirmed by 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 6363 (2d Cir. N.Y. Apr. 3,
1996), cert. denied 523 U.S. 1106 (1998).
36
By way of background, the computer program at issue was called
“Dentalab” and was written by an employee, Ms. Elaine Whelan, of an
outside company, Strohl Systems Group, Inc. “Dentalab” was written in a
computer program language called Event Driven Language (EDL). The
program was successful and began operation at Jaslow in March of 1979.
Whelan,797 F.2d at 1225–26. Ms. Whelan left Strohl shortly after
developing Dentalab and formed her own company, Whelan Associates,
Inc. Id. at 1226. After the formation of Whelan Associates, Jaslow
entered into a written agreement with Whelan for the exploitation of the
“Dentalab” program and to share in the profits. Id. Without informing
Whelan of his plan, Rand Jaslow of Jaslow Labs, decided that the
Dentalab program would benefit all other dental labs, like Jaslow, and
began developing Dentalab in BASIC, as opposed to EDL, language. Id.
[Many smaller dental labs computer systems did not operate in EDL
language]. Rand then formed his own company, Dentcom, and sought to
terminate his agreement with Whelan. It was this program that was the
alleged infringer of Whelan’s EDL Dentalab program. Id.
37
Whelan, 797 F.2d. at 1227.
38
Id. at 1228.
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to lie solely with Whelan.39 The court also determined that
Whelan’s copyright in Dentalab was in fact a valid copyright,
and Dentcom’s twenty-three sales of the Dentalab computer
program were violations40 of this copyright.41 Finally, the
district court held that the Dentalab copyright was infringed
because the “overall structure” of Dentcom was substantially
similar to the overall structure of Dentalab.42
On appeal, the Third Circuit adopted the substantial
similarity test,43 hinted at by the district court for determining
copyright infringement, and found for Whelan. The court,
relying on SAS Institute, Inc. v. S & H Computer Systems,
Inc.,44 held that the non-literal elements, or structure of a
computer program, which Whelan alleged were infringed,
were protectable elements under the Copyright Act.45 The
court determined that 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) “extends
copyright protection to ‘literary works,’ and computer
programs are classified as literary works for the purposes of

39

Id.
To present a prima facie case of copyright infringement, the
plaintiff must prove two things: 1) that they do in fact own the copyright
which they allege to have been infringed, and 2) that the copyright has
been copied by the alleged infringer. See Id. at 1231, see also Sid &
Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1162 (9th Cir. 1977); Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533
F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976).
41
Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d, 1222, 1228
(3d Cir. 1986).
42
Id. at 1233.
43
The Substantial Similarity test is a single inquiry test where a
finder of fact makes two findings of substantial similarity to support a
copyright violation. First, the fact-finder must determine, with the aid of
expert testimony, whether there is sufficient similarity between the two
copyrighted works at issue to conclude whether the alleged infringer used
the copyrighted work to make his/her own. Second, if the answer to the
first question is in the affirmative, the fact-finder must determine, through
layperson testimony, whether the copying was “illicit” or “an unlawful
appropriation” of the copyrighted work. See e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154
F.2d 464, 468–69 (2d Cir. 1946).
44
SAS Institute, Inc. v. S & H Computer Systems, Inc., 605 F. Supp.
816 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (the only other case, at the time, which addressed
the issue of non-literal vs. literal elements of a computer program)
45
See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1238–39.
40

2008

Computer Programs

117

copyright.”46 The court also noted that the copyrights of other
literary works can be infringed even when there is no
substantial similarity between the works literal elements.47
The Third Circuit in Whelan created some controversy
with its decision because it extended copyright protection to a
facet of a program that lacked originality and completely
ignored the idea-expression dichotomy.48 However, the
Second Circuit in Computer Associates abandoned the Third
Circuit’s reasoning in Whelan.49
The Second Circuit, on appeal from the Eastern District
of New York, took one giant stride further in Computer
Associates50 than the Third Circuit did in Whelan. The court
46

Id. at 1234; see also H.R. Rep. No.94-1476 at 5 (1976), 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 54, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5659,
5667.
47
Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d, 1222,1234
(3d Cir. 1986).
48
Patry, supra note 17, at 51.
The court in Whelan made note that its decision would be put at odds
with Justice Higginbotham's opinion in Synercom Tech., Inc. v.
University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978), where
Justice Higginbotham held that “input formats” of computer programs
were ideas and not expression and, thus, were not copyrightable subject
matter. Justice Becker noted that the two cases may be distinguishable
but still proceeded to “come to grips” with Higginbotham’s opinion in
Synercom, and ultimately decided that Higginbotham’s distinction
between the copyrightability of sequence and form in the computer
context and in any other context, was an incorrect one. Whelan, 797 F.2d
at 1240. Becker’s reasoning was that since Congress has not yet passed
any special provision differentiating between ordering and sequencing of
computer programs, Higginbotham was incorrect to take it into his own
hands. Id.
49
Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir.
1992). It is important to clarify that Whelan was decided by the Third
Circuit and Computer Associate’s was decided by the Second Circuit.
Currently, the Supreme Court has yet to make a final determination as to
the correct course of action. As it stands now, there is a split between the
nine circuits, the majority of which follow the Second Circuit in
Computer Associates, with a small minority following the Third Circuit’s
approach in Whelan.
50
By way of background, both parties, Computer Associates
[hereinafter CA] and Altai, were in the business of developing various
types of computer software. Involved in this dispute was CA’s program
called “Scheduler,” and Altai’s program called “Zeke.” “Scheduler” is a

118

Trends and Issues in Intellectual Property

Vol. 3

devised a three prong “abstraction-filtration-comparison”
test,51 when deciding the issue of computer program
copyright infringement. This test requires district courts to
first dissect each component of the program and isolate each
abstracted level contained in the specific computer program.52
The court must then examine the structural components at
each level that has been abstracted to determine if each
abstraction is an idea or a copyright protected expression.53
If the court found that any or all of the abstractions contained
an expression, the final step was to determine if any of the
expressions have been copied by the defendant.54

program designed for IBM computers which acts as a business scheduler,
and contains an important sub-component called “Adapter” which acts an
operating system compatibility component, or translator. “Scheduler”
was designed to operate on an IBM System 370 family of computers
which contain one of three operating systems, DOS/VSE, MVS, or CMS.
“Adapter” is what allows “Scheduler” to operate on multiple operating
systems without having to change software. Altai’s “Zeke” program was
designed to operate on a MVS operating system, similar to “Scheduler.”
However, before “Zeke” became operational on a MVS system, an
employee of Altai, James P. Williams, approached Claude F. Arney, III, a
programmer employed by CA, about the possibility of him coming to
Altai to help develop “Zeke’s” MVS system compatibility. Arney
participated substantially in the creation of “Adapter” while he was
employed at CA, and although Williams knew about “Scheduler” and
“Adapter,” he did not know that “Adapter” was a component of
“Scheduler.” Arney left CA to work for Altai shortly thereafter and took
copies of the source code for both the VSE and MVS versions of
“Adapter.” Arney then, using the “Adapter’s” source code, created two
versions of “Oscar,” Altai’s version of “Adapter,” which permitted
“Zeke” to operate on a MVS and VSE operating system.
51
Computer Assocs. Int’l., Inc v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693,
706 (2d Cir. 1992) ; see also Justice Learned Hands decision in Nichols v.
Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir.1930) (where Justice
Hand articulated what is now known as the “abstractions” test for
separating an idea from an expression [hereinafter referred to as the IdeaExpression dichotomy].
52
Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 706–07.
53
Id. at 707; see also 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.03[F], at 13
62.34-63 (discusses the “successive filtering method” adopted by Justice
Walker’s “filtration” prong to the “abstraction-filtration-comparison” test
used in Computer Associates).
54
Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 710.
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This approach from Computer Associates has been said to
be overly complicated, while the Whelan approach has been
said to be overly simplistic.55 Which approach is most
effective? The three-prong test from Computer Associates.
This is chiefly because it gives the court the opportunity to
break down the program to its “bare-bones” to see what
actually comprises it, which arguably, would allow the court
to make a sound, correct decision when faced with a
copyright infringement suit involving a computer program.
The downside to this approach, well presented by Professor
Patry,56 is that the three prong test devised by the Second
Circuit benefits only one type of person, the expert witness,
whose services are desperately needed by the courts since
most judges, though not all, do not have backgrounds in
computer programming.57
The preceding discussion has focused on the history and
reasonably simplistic nature of computer program protection
under United States copyright law.58 The next section turns

55

Patry, supra note 17, at 55
Patry, supra note 17, at 55.
57
Remember, it is imperative for attorneys and law students to pay
very close attention to the jurisdiction in which they are located to
determine which approach the court in that jurisdiction follows.
Remember, there is a split among the circuits as to which test is applied,
i.e. the substantial similarity test devised by the Third Circuit, and the
abstraction-filtration-comparison test developed by the Second Circuit.
58
For an example of computer programs that have purposes to
commit copyright infringement, see BMG Music, et al. v. Gonzalez, 430
F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2005). (defendant was found liable, at summary
judgment, for “direct copyright infringement” by downloading 30
copyrighted songs onto her computer using an on-line computer program
search engine. The court, in finding for the plaintiff recording companies,
rejected the defendants “fair use” and “innocent infringer” defenses. See
also In Re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003) (it is not
enough that a product [computer software] be capable of non-infringing
uses. A defendant must show evidence that the service has ever been
used for such non-infringing uses); and A&M Records Inc. v. Napster,
239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (on its face the Copyright Act's definition of
digital audio recording devices, computers are not digital audio recording
devices because their 'primary purpose' is not to produce digital audio
copied recordings).
56
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to computer program protection under United States patent
law.
B. United States Patent Law as Applied to
Computer Programs
“A patent offers greater protection . . . than a
copyright, for it can protect the principle
underlying a mechanism or process as well as
the specific form.” 59
Patents are a very powerful and desirable protection for
inventors.60 As such, a computer program patent would make
it illegal for any unauthorized person to make, use, or sell the
patented program.61 However, it is extremely difficult for
patent applicants to achieve that level of security because the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) has
treated applications for computer programs as a “special case,
and set hurdle after hurdle in the way of treating them as
patentable subject matter under section 101 of the Patent
Act.”62 Some have even claimed that software patents are the
most scrutinized within the intellectual property world.63 The
problems with computer programs are that they do not easily
meet the strict standards for patents – novelty, utility and
non-obviousness – and the Supreme Court has made it clear
that these tests set a high standard.64
Someone new to patent law may first look at computer
programs and see a simple process, which, under the Patent
59

Jean F. Rydstrom, Patentability of Computer Programs, 6 ALR
Fed 156, 160 (1971), citing Bender, Computer Programs: Should They be
Patentable? 68 COLUMBIA L. REV. 241 (1968).
60
GALLER, supra note 15, at 31.
61
Computer Programs and Proposed Revisions of the Patent and
Copyright Laws, 81 HARVARD L. REV. 1541, 1553 (1968).
62
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 10, at 952.
63
See e.g. Anthony E. Anderson, Article, Taming The Code:
Effectively Implementing Software Patents, 5 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL.
PROP. L. 381, 382 (2006).
64
Computer Programs, supra note 62; citing Graham v. John Deere,
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 19 (1966).
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Act, would be patentable subject matter.65 However, while
simple, these processes can create problems for the courts,
like ones with limited capabilities such as a process which
recites mathematical algorithms, and, according to the courts,
such mathematical algorithms were once not viewed as
patentable subject matter.66 The issues concerning the
patentability of computer programs has been a hot topic of
judicial debate over the past twenty-five or so years, and this
debate among the courts began with the 1972 Supreme Court
decision, Gottschalk v. Benson.67
The Supreme Court in Benson was faced with deciding
whether an invention described as being similar to “the
process of data by program and more particularly to the
programmed conversion of numerical information” in
general-purpose digital computers.68 To simplify the above
invention, this process was essentially a method for
“converting binary-coded decimal (BCD) numerals into pure
binary numerals.”69 This method was what the court
ultimately coined as a mathematical algorithm, or a
“procedure for solving a given type of mathematical
problem.”70
Procedurally, in Benson, the PTO examiner initially
rejected two claims of the application, claim 8 and claim 13,
as being outside the scope of section 101 of the Patent Act.71
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, however,
sustained the same two claims which the PTO initially
rejected.72 On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed with the
PTO examiner, and held that this algorithm was outside the
scope of patentable subject matter pursuant to section 101 of
65

Carstens, supra note 6, at 20.
Id.
67
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
68
Id. at 64; see also Ralph D. Clifford, The Federal Circuit’s Cruise
to Uncharted Waters: How Patent Protection for Algorithms and Business
Methods May Sink the UCITA and State Intellectual Property Protection,
73 TEMPLE L. Rev. 1241, 1243 (2000), and Carstens, supra note 6
69
See Benson, 409 U.S. at 64.
70
Id. at 65.
71
See Id., see also Clifford, supra note 68
72
Benson, 409 U.S. at 65
66
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the Patent Act. In so holding, the Court stated that “the
mathematical formula involved here has no substantial
practical application except in connection with a digital
computer, which means that . . . the patent would wholly
preempt the mathematical formula and . . . would be a patent
on the algorithm itself.”73 Essentially what the Court did in
Benson was create an exception to the scope of section 101 of
the Patent Act, known as the “mathematical algorithm”
exception,74 and refused to extend patent protection to
computer programs because the algorithm “had no substantial
practical application.”75
Despite its admitted, albeit disguised, ignorance on the
subject,76 the Supreme Court, upheld its Benson decision in
the subsequent case of Parker v. Flook.77 This case involved
an application for a patent on a “Method of Updating Alarm
Limits.”78 The Court made an important initial distinction of
this method in noting that the only novel feature of the
method was the mathematical algorithm.79
73

Id. at 71–72.
See Clifford, supra note 68 at 1242.
75
Benson, 409 U.S. at 71.
76
Of important note to this discussion, is that the Supreme Court, in
dicta, made a few statements that seemed to be an “ill-fit” with the crux of
its argument. For example, the Court stated first that “[I]t may be that the
patent laws should be extended to cover these programs, a policy matter
to which we are not competent to speak [emphasis added]. Benson, 409
U.S., at 257. The court then went on and practically conceded its
ignorance on the topic when it said “[I]f these programs are to be
patentable, considerable problems are raised which only committees of
Congress can manage . . .” Id., at 258. In its argument, the Court seemed
to proffer a fairly coherent opinion while rejecting the patentability of a
mathematical algorithm, but at the same time it conceded that it was
totally ignorant on the subject. So it is in this writers opinion that the
Supreme Court was not yet prepared to handle such a case, and truly find
it difficult to believe that this opinion was afforded a great amount of
relevance.
77
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978).
78
Id. at 585.
Essentially, an “alarm limit” is a number. These “alarm limits”
were to be used in conjunction with catalytic conversion processes where
the “alarm limit” would alert the user when the process approached an
abnormal condition.
79
Id. at 585.
74
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Procedurally, the PTO examiner once again rejected the
application and found that “the mathematical formula
constituted the only difference between the prior art80 and the
invention.”81 Following its actions taken in the Flook
litigation, the C.C.P.A (predecessor to the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit) reversed the PTO by reading Benson
to apply to only those claims which sought to entirely
preempt a mathematical algorithm, and that since the
inventor’s process would not constitute infringement of the
claims, a patent would not preempt the algorithm.82 Also
adhering to its precedent was the Supreme Court, which
reversed the C.C.P.A., and held that “[R]espondent’s
application simply provides a new and presumably better
method for calculating alarm limit values.”83 The Court
opined further, and more importantly, that the “ . . . process is
un-patentable under § 101, not because it contains a
mathematical algorithm as one component, but because once
that algorithm is assumed to be within the prior art, the
application, considered as a whole, contains no patentable
invention.”84
In Flook, the Supreme Court once again rejected the
patentability of a mathematical algorithm/computer program,
but the Flook decision was not unanimous, as there were
three dissenting Justices. The crux of the Dissent’s argument
was that this case was far different from Benson in that the
mathematical algorithm at issue in Flook comprised only one
step of the entire process, whereas in Benson, the
mathematical algorithm was the invention.85 The Supreme
Court’s stubbornness to uphold a patent for a “computer

80

Prior Art is the crux of the statutory bar of novelty under Patent
law. An invention is in the prior art if it has already been patented or
described in a printed publication in any country, or if it is in public use or
on sale in the United States, for more than one year prior to the date the
patent is applied for. See generally 35 U.S.C.A. § 102(b).
81
Flook, 437 U.S. at 587.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 594–95.
84
Id. at 594.
85
See id. at 599.
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related” program did not stop the Federal Circuit from
holding otherwise, and the debate continued.
For example, the Federal Circuit’s decision, Application
of Diehr,86 demonstrated its stern opposition to the Supreme
Court’s view on the subject.87 Reminiscent of its previous
actions, the PTO examiner, utilizing the Court’s reasoning
from Flook, rejected the inventor’s claims88 On appeal,
however, the Federal Circuit held that the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in Benson and Flook did not deny patentability to a
claim as non-statutory simply because it involved a computer
program or because it was computer related.89 The Federal
Circuit was of the opinion that “claims may be rejected under
section 101 because they attempt to embrace only . . . a
mathematical algorithm . . . but not merely because they
define inventions having something to do with a computer.”90
Basically, instead of removing the algorithm claim to
determine the patentability of the remaining claims [like the
Supreme Court], the Federal Circuit in Diehr looked at all the
claims, including the algorithm claim, and found for
patentability because the claims, as a whole, satisfied the
requirements for patent. Once again, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine if this court was correct.91
Astonishingly, the Supreme Court upheld the Federal
Circuit’s granting of the patent at issue, marking the first time
the “high-nine” affirmed the patentability of a computerrelated invention.92 The Supreme Court held the way it did
because it totally set aside anything to do with the
mathematical algorithm and decided whether the process for
molding rubber, as a whole, was patentable subject matter
86

Application of Diehr, 602 F.2d 982 (1979).
Diehr involved a method for operating molding presses used
during the manufacture of rubber products. This method, to be
successful, relied upon a mathematical equation called the “Arrhenius
equation.” For a discussion on the Arrhenius equation, see Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 178, n. 2 (1981).
88
Application of Diehr, 602 F.2d at 984–85.
89
Id. at 986.
90
Id. at 986–87.
91
See Diamond, 450 U.S. at 175.
92
See Id.
87
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within section 101 of the Patent Act.93 This landmark
decision, although very similar to the Benson-Flook line of
cases, opened the floodgates for computer program patents in
the United States.94
Subsequent to the court’s decision in In Re Lowry,95 the
Patent and Trademark Office began to take notice of the issue
and realized that it was time to start paying heed to patent
applications for computer-type programs. In Lowry,96 the
court noted that in determining the novelty of a computer
memory, which embodied a novel data structure, the Patent
and Trademark Office could not disregard the data structure
on the ground that it constituted unpatentable printed
matter.97 In its decision, the Federal Circuit essentially
summoned the PTO, and for the PTO, it was a wake-up call.
93

Id. at 191.
Following the Diehr decision, a vast amount of Federal Circuit
cases upheld patents for computer-related programs in 1994, including In
Re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed.Cir.1994) (where it was held that a patent
that functionally defined a machine that manipulated data for an
oscilloscope display was patentable subject matter under §101 of the
Patent Act); In Re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354 (Fed.Cir.1994) (which held
that a machine with a data structure embedded in its memory qualified for
a patent, although a method for generating a data structure did not); and In
Re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290 (Fed.Cir.1994) (where the court held that when
a functional step [i.e., a physical display of data] was added to a once
unpatentable algorithm, the whole method would pass muster for
patentability); see also Goldstein, supra note 10, at 953.
95
In Re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579 (Fed.Cir.1994); see also GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 10, at 953.
96
Lowry involved a patent application for a “Data Processing System
Having a Data Structure with a Single, Simple Primitive.” 32 F.3d at
1580. This invention was basically a memory storage program and
effectively organized and stored data in a computer memory. The Patent
examiner rejected claims 1-5 of the application as unpatentable subject
matter pursuant to the section 101 of the Patent Act, and also rejected
claims 20–29 as unpatentable pursuant to section 102(e). Claims 1–19
were also rejected pursuant to section 103 of the Act. The Board reversed
the Examiners rejection of claims 1–5 and held that “a memory containing
stored information, as a whole, recited an article of manufacture,” and
was patentable subject matter. Id. at 1582. The Board affirmed the
Examiner’s rejection pertaining to sections 102(2) and 103. Lowry
appealed.
97
In Re Lowry, 32 F.3d at 1582.
94

126

Trends and Issues in Intellectual Property

Vol. 3

Subsequent to Lowry, yet another controversial, but
important case in the computer program patent war came
down from the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature
Financial Group, Inc,98 where the court expressly ignored the
Supreme Court’s “mathematical algorithm exception.”
In State Street, a patent for a “data processing system for
Hub and Spoke Financial Services Configuration”99 was
applied for.100 The court was forced to decide whether this
patent was invalid for failing to state a claim of statutory
subject matter as required pursuant to section 101 of the
Patent Act. The court held, that the “mathematical algorithm
exception,” created by the Supreme Court in Benson, when
applied to Claim 1 of the “hub and spoke” invention at issue,
was not applicable because the algorithm encompassing
Claim 1 produced a “useful, concrete, and tangible result,”
which “renders it statutory subject matter, even if the useful
result is expressed in numbers . . .”101 The court upheld the
patent.102
State Street has been viewed by some to be a
controversial decision because it upheld a patent that claimed
nothing more than mathematical equations while at the same
time failed to claim any specific algorithm.103 Some have
argued that the court upholds patents, like the one at issue in
98

State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d
1368 (1998).
99
Essentially, this invention facilitated a structure whereby mutual
funds pool their assets into an investment portfolio organized as a
partnership. See Id. Such a system is referred to as a “Hub and Spoke”
system. See id.
100
State Street, 149 F.3d at 1370.
101
See id. at 1375; see also In Re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (data transformed by a machine through a series of mathematical
equations which produced a smooth display on a rasterizer monitor,
constituted “a practical application of an abstract idea” because “a useful,
concrete and tangible result” was produced).
102
The Federal Circuit acted to essentially dispose of the so-called
“business method exception.” The business method exception was
basically a judicially created exception to section 101 of the Patent Act,
very similar to that of the mathematical algorithm exception.
103
See Jay Dratler, Jr., Alice in Wonderland Meets the U.S. Patent
System, 38 AKRON L. REV. 299, 302–03 (2005).
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State Street, because the PTO and the Federal Circuit have
developed a “land rush” mentality toward patents, meaning
the more patents they can issue the better.104 Such a mentality
has been said to create a significant mental block among the
basic institutions of this country’s original patent system
concerning the simple, but important, notation of balance,
which had made this system so effective in the first place.105
Notwithstanding its controversial decision, the Federal
Circuit subsequently decided AT&T Corp. v. Excel
Communications, Inc.,106 and effectively upheld its
contentious decision in State Street, and again refused to
apply the mathematical algorithm exception.
In AT&T, the court was faced with deciding whether an
invention described as a “Call Message Recording for
Telephone Systems” was patentable subject matter within the
meaning of section 101 of the Patent Act.107 The PTO
initially rejected this patent application for reasons unrelated
to section 101.108 The district court upheld the PTO’s
rejection on the grounds that the patent implicitly recited a
mathematical algorithm and that the only physical step in the
claims involved the data-gathering process for the algorithm,
and thus, was excluded from patentability under the
“mathematical algorithm exception.”109
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted, at the outset, that
“[W]hether stated implicitly or explicitly, we consider the
scope of section 101 to be the same regardless of the form –
machine or process – in which a particular claim is
104

See id. at 303–04.
See id. at 304.
106
AT&T Corp v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, (1999);
cert. denied 528 U.S. 946 (1999).
107
See id. at 1353.
This Call Message Recording System contained a three step process for
when a caller made a direct-dialed long distance telephone call: 1) after
the long-distance phone call was placed and recognized by its local
exchange carrier (LEC) it would be routed automatically to a primary
inter-exchange carrier (PIC); 2) the PIC then carries the phone call to the
LEC which serves the recipient of the call; and 3) the recipient’s LEC
delivered the call to the recipient, using the local network. See Id. at 1354.
108
AT&T, 172 F.3d at 1354.
109
Id. at 1355–56.
105
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drafted.”110 “In fact, whether the invention is a process or a
machine is irrelevant . . . and we are comfortable in applying
our reasoning in Alappat and State Street to the method
claims at issue in this case.”111 Thus, the court expressly
affirmed its decisions in those two previous cases.
Thereafter, the Federal Circuit focused its analysis on the
issue at hand, “whether the mathematical algorithm is applied
in a practical manner to produce a useful result.”112 The court
held in the affirmative. It held that the district court failed to
apply the appropriate analysis to the method claims at issue
and that had they conducted the proper analysis, it would
have easily found that the claims applied for would have
clearly fallen within the scope of section 101 of the Patent
Act.113
The Federal Circuit has effectively discarded the
“mathematical algorithm exception” once implemented by
the Supreme Court in Benson, and has essentially permitted
the patenting of both computer program patents, patents that
comprise a mathematical algorithm, and also patents for
business methods. As a result, the PTO has been showered
with applications for the very same.
One can see the difficulty computer programs cause for
the PTO and for the courts in this country. To help evade the
eradication of the United States Patent system as applied to
computer programs, this article now turns to a discussion on
how international governments have attached intellectual
property protection for computer programs.

II. COMPUTER PROGRAM PROTECTION UNDER AN
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
REGIME
The purpose of this section is to introduce a model of an
international approach to intellectual property law as it
110

Id. at 1357.
Id. at 1358.
112
Id. at 1360.
113
Id. at 1361.
111

2008

Computer Programs

129

applies to computer programs. Although only the surface
will be penetrated, this section aims to summarize the
approach taken by the European Community in codifying its
own intellectual property legislation specific to computer
programs. European intellectual property law was chosen to
assist the law student and/or attorney with this discussion
because Europe follows an approach in which the United
States should follow. Review of international approaches
was also chosen because in the United States legal education
system, exclusive of courses and programs devoted to
international law, there is very little exposure to international
legislation, particularly international intellectual property
law.114
A. The European Community’s Approach to
Intellectual Property Protection for
Computer Programs
Research conducted on this issue, and how it has been
approached by the European Community, revealed a very
impressive approach as to how the European Community
(“EC”)115 handled the complexity of the situation that is
computer programs. On May 14, 1991, the EC’s Council of
Ministers adopted the Directive on the Legal Protection of
Computer Programs.116 With the enactment of this Software
Directive, the EC leapt ahead of the United States and Japan,
two world leaders in computer programming and
technology.117
What is ideal about this directive is that its drafters
recognized the dilemma concerning computer programs. In
the Preamble of the Software Directive, for example, several
114

This, of course, is also exclusive of courses and/or lectures about
the Berne Convention on Copyright, and other similar treaties to which
the United States is, or is not a party or signatory to.
115
The European Community is now commonly referred to as the
European Union, or EU.
116
Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the Legal
Protection of Computer Programs, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42 [hereinafter
Software Directive]; see also Palmer & Vinje, supra note 121, at 65.
117
See Palmer & Vinje, supra note 121, at 66.
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provisions explain why this Directive has been passed; one
such provision reads, “ . . . computer programs are playing an
increasingly important role in a broad range of industries and
computer program technology can accordingly be considered
as being of fundamental importance for the Community’s
industrial development.”118 This provision clearly recognizes
the significance of computer programs in European society.
Article 1(1) continues, “[I]n accordance with the provisions
of this Directive, Member States shall protect computer
programs, by copyright, as literary works within the meaning
of the Berne Convention….”119 The EC has recognized the
significance of computer programs, the problems associated
with protecting them, and that they should be protected under
European copyright law as literary works.
With the passing of the Software Directive, the EC has
essentially created a sui generis120 body of law, which is the
approach that this writer suggests the United States Congress
must take. 121Several Articles of the directive mirror United
States copyright law. Specifically, Article 4(a) of the
Directive includes some very special language which the

118

Software Directive, supra note 116, at Preamble.
Id. at Article 1(1).
Also, Article 1(2) stated, similar to the American Idea-Expression
dichotomy, that only the expressions of a computer program are to be
protected by this Directive and any ideas and principles associated with
any element of a program are not to be protected under the Directive.
120
For a discussion on sui generis legislation, see Pamela Samuelson,
Creating a New Kind of Intellectual Property: Applying the Lessons of the
Chip Law to Computer Programs, 70 MINN. L. REV. 471 (1986).
121
Although the Software Directive specifically states that copyright
law is to be used, the EC has devised legislation specific to computer
programs, which comprises some copyright and some patent law in terms
of the American definition, which is very much like creating a sui generis
body of law. Congress has enacted sui generis legislation before when it
passed the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98620, tit. III, 98 Stat. 3347 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§901-914 (Supp. II
1984)); see also Samuelson, supra at 471 n.3. Prior to that Act, Congress
had enacted sui generis type legislation when it provided for protection
for non-obvious ornamental designs for articles of manufacture in 1870,
see Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230,§71-76, 16 Stat. 198, 209–10 (codified at
35 U.S.C. §171-173 (1982)) cited by Samuelson, supra at 472 n.4.
119
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United States must implement into its own sui generis
legislation.
Article 4(a) of the Directive permits the owner of a
program to have the exclusive right to do or authorize
“. . . the permanent or temporary reproduction of a computer
program by any means and in any form, in part or in
whole.”122 This sounds very similar to United States
copyright law. Article 4(a) continues, “[i]nsofar as loading,
displaying, running, transmission or storage of the computer
program necessitate such reproduction, such acts shall be
subject to authorization by the rightholder.”123 Again, this
parallels United States Copyright law. This section of the
Directive reads like a hybrid body of law comprising mostly
copyright law, with some patent law mixed in. The first part
of Article 4(a) reads much like the copyright system in the
U.S., giving the holder the absolute right to copy his or her
work, and the second part reads somewhat like patent law
giving the holder the exclusive right to control how the
program is used, reproduced or distributed, including the
holder’s right to express authorization. However, to better
understand what Europe has actually done, let us explore
Article 4 a little more deeply.
Article 4(b) of the Software Directive permits the right
holder with “the right to do or to authorize . . . the translation,
adaptation, arrangement and any other alteration of a
computer program and the reproduction of the results
thereof . . .”124 Article 4(c) permits the right holder “to do or
to authorize. . . any form of distribution to the public . . . of
the original computer program or of copies thereof.”125
The remainder of Article 4 illustrated above seems to
represent more copyright law than patent law. For example,
Article 4(b) permits the author to control how the computer
program is translated, adapted, arranged or altered, which is
one of the protections granted under American copyright law.
Article 4(c) of the Directive permits the author to control how
122

Software Directive, supra note 124, at art. 4(a).
Id.
124
Id. at Art. 4(b).
125
Id. at Art. 4(c).
123
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the computer program is distributed to the public, which is
also a protection granted under American copyright law. The
right to use, make or sell an invention126 is the crux of
American patent law, and some of that can be read into
Article 4(c) above.127 So, although Article 4(a) and 4(c)
contain some language which can be associated with
American patent law, Europe has essentially taken European
copyright law and explicitly applied it to computer
programs.128
In so doing, Europe has created a unique and peculiar
body of law, sui generis, by taking bits and pieces of its own
Copyright law, and applied it directly to computer programs.
Undoubtedly, it would not seem to be all that taxing for
Congress to take a similar approach and enact a sui generis
body of law,129 both detailed and specific, which would act to

126

See generally 35 U.S.C.A §154.
For example, the phrase “distributed to the public,” may be
interpreted to possibly mean “selling.”
128
For an analysis of the Software Directive in the European Court of
Justice, see Order of the President of the Court of First Instance of 22
December 2004, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n of the Eur. Cmtys,
Proceedings for interim relief - Article 82 EC. Case T-201/04 R,
available at 2004 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 704 (2004) (this case was a dispute
between Microsoft Corporation and Sun Microsystems, where Sun
alleged that Microsoft was abusing its dominant position when it refused
to disclose to it the technology necessary to allow interoperability of its
work group server operating system with the Windows Client PC
operating system. The court noted that the communications protocols
were protected by copyright under the Berne and by Council Directive
91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer
programs. Thus, the court held that although Microsoft’s communications
protocols were protected by copyright, implementation of the
communications protocols does not constitute a form of exploitation
prohibited by copyright).
129
Congress has already enacted quasi-sui generis legislation when it
extended copyright protection to computer programs in machine-readable
form when it passed section 10 of the Act of December 12, 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §101 (1982) and
17 U.S.C.A. §117, cited by Samuelson, supra at 474 n. 12. However,
these amendments made to the Copyright Act were relatively minor,
because all Congress did was add a definition of computer program into
section 101, and by substituting an amended section 117 which gave
127
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simplify intellectual property protection for computer
programs in the United States system.
III. WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE
Currently, the Patent and Trademark Office is teeming
with patent applications, where approximately 443,652
patents were applied for in the 2006 fiscal year.130 In the
same year, only 183,187 patents were issued.131 That means
260,465 patent applications were either denied or not
prosecuted. With respect to patent applications for computer
software, in 2003 there were approximately 25,475 patent
applications for computer software and approximately 12,371
applications for mathematical algorithms.132 In addition, an
application for software will be pending, on average, for
forty-four months.133 These facts have created significant
uproar amongst proponents of computer software patents.134
Because of this alarming number of patent applications, and
the amount of time it can take to prosecute a computer
software patent, the Patent Act needs major revision.
Specifically, section 3 of the Patent Act135 must be
revised to address this patent mishandling problem by
owners of copyrighted computer programs a limited right to modify them
and archive copies of them. See e.g., Samuelson, supra, at 474–75 n. 12.
130
United States Patent and Trademark Office, 2006 Fiscal Year
USPTO Workloads, Table 2, available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2006/50302_table2.html
[Hereinafter USPTO] (This number is a 312,249 increase from the
131,403 patents applied for in 1986).
131
Id. at Table 6.
132
Allen Clark Zoracki, When is an Algorithm Invented? The Need
for a New Paradigm for Evaluating an Algoritgm for Intellectual
Property Protection, 15 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 579, 585 (2005). [I was
unable to verify the accuracy of these numbers, hence why the term
approximately was used. I was also unable, after an exhaustive search, to
locate more current numbers. However, it is fair to say that the number of
applications for software has drastically increased from 2003].
133
USPTO, supra at Table 4.
134
See Anderson, supra note 64, at 383.
135
Section 3 of the United States Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. §§1-376, is
the section that establishes the directors and employees of the PTO. I
believe the scope of section 3 should be broadened and/or specified to
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broadening the scope of examiners permitted to prosecute
patents at the PTO. The only way computer program
applications can be prosecuted fairly and thoroughly, is to
increase the number of examiners, as a whole, and also
ensure that they come with computer programming
backgrounds.
In the alternative, if the Patent Act cannot undergo major
revision, and pursuant to the goal and purpose of this article,
Congress must enact a completely separate body of law
specific to computer programs. Such a distinctive body of
law is referred to as a sui generis legal regime, taking bits and
pieces from both copyright and patent, and blending them
together.136 By passing such a body of law specific to
computer programs, this country will be able to avoid future
divergence between the courts, and would also ease the
tension and stress of prosecuting computer program patents.
IV. CONCLUSION
Should Congress use copyright law, patent law or a
quantity of both? You may recall this question being posed
to you at the beginning of this note. That is the question that
I have attempted to resolve throughout, and the answer to this
question should have been readily apparent, sui generis
legislation is needed.
As articulated above, sui generis legislation is a body of
law that is unique or peculiar, and not specific to one area of
law.137 This is chiefly the case because one specific area of
law is not, in itself, always sufficient to deal with a complex
legal issue; here, intellectual property protection for computer
programs.138 In dealing with the convolution that is caused
by computer programs, copyright law and patent law,
respectively each by itself, do not offer a comprehensive
allow for examiners to come from a broader range of educational
backgrounds, including computer programming.
136
Palmer & Vinje, The EC Directive on the Legal Protection
of Computer Software: New Law Governing Software Development,
2 DUKE J. OF COMP. & INT’L L. 65, 66 (1992).
137
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 2.
138
Id.
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body of legislation. Such a lack of depth ultimately deprives
the courts of the opportunity to meticulously preside over
litigation involving computer programs.
Thus, it is
imperative for Congress to enact sui generis legislation
specific to computer programs, whereby molding pieces of
both copyright law and patent law together into one unique
body of law.
To achieve such a result, Congress should mirror the
Software Directive enacted by Parliament in the European
Community. It is clear that the EC Parliament recognized the
crisis that computer programs presented to its intellectual
property legislation, and it wasted little time in enacting
appropriate legislation to resolve that problem. Hopefully,
Congress can work toward achieving the same goal

